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Footnotes
1. Determining who has jurisdiction over criminal activity can be a
particularly confusing analysis that requires an assessment of sev-
eral questions, including the status of the land on which the crime
occurred, the type of crime committed, the race of the perpetra-
tor(s) and other interested parties, and other assorted factors. To
use the criminal context as an example, in general, the federal gov-
ernment has the authority to prosecute Natives for “major” crimes
and non-Natives for any crime that occurs in “Indian Country”
under various federal statutes. See Major Crimes Act, Act of Mar.
3, 1885, ch. 341, § 9; 23 Stat. 362, 385 (1885) (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 1153); Indian Country Crimes Act, Act of June 25, 1948,
ch. 645, 62 Stat. 757 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1152). However, if the
reservation upon which the crime occurred is a “Public Law 280”
state, then the state will likely have the same criminal jurisdiction
that the federal government otherwise would have had. See Public
Law 280, 18 U.S.C. § 1162, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321—1326, and 28
U.S.C. § 1360. Nonetheless, Public Law 280 exempts certain tribal
nations from the statute, thus maintaining federal jurisdiction on
those reservations. Tribal nations have concurrent jurisdiction over
Natives, subject to some limitations on sentencing that will be dis-
cussed later in this paper, and no jurisdiction over non-Natives,
which will also be discussed later in this paper. See Indian Civil
Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-03, and Oliphant v. Suquamish
Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). For a concise analysis that
offers some guidance through the jurisdictional maze of criminal
law in Indian Country see DAVID H. GETCHES, CHARLES F.
WILKINSON, ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., MATTHEW L.M. FLETCHER,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 483-487 (6th ed.
2011). Civil jurisdictional questions involve a slightly different
analysis that is nonetheless confusing in its own right.
No other branch of any government at any level in the
United States faces the same sorts of unique challenges, juris-
dictional quandaries,1 resource limitations, and threats to its
authority than tribal courts. Yet, despite the challenges tribal
courts face—not the least of which is a wariness and some-
times outright hostility from other American courts—tribal
nations and especially tribal courts have grown increasingly
adept and innovative at finding ways to overcome the myriad
of hurdles that confront them.
The role of today’s tribal court often requires it to blend two
different, although not necessarily competing, legal traditions:
older tribal common law and more recent Western-inspired
sources of law, such as constitutions and codes. Many tribal
courts have risen to the challenge, finding innovative ways to
make the teachings, traditions, and rules of previous genera-
tions—the common law of the tribal nation—speak to the issues
of the present and provide guidance in how to read the contem-
porary law of the community. This valuable work has helped
tribal nations develop and engage in American legal, political,
and financial life like never before, with substantial benefits to
tribal peoples in a changing world with greater opportunities.
Unfortunately, the innovative work that many tribal courts
are engaged in is not always recognized and appreciated out-
side of Indian Country. As a consequence, there remains a fair
amount of trepidation about tribal courts, particularly in other
American courts and perhaps especially in the Supreme Court.
This trepidation is often founded by the same presumptions
about tribal peoples that existed in the nineteenth century and
were expressed in the Indian law cases of that era.
It is time for judges at all levels to reexamine the bases of
their perceptions about tribal courts. This article hopes to pro-
voke that critical reflection through a brief examination of the
history of tribal courts. The first section of the article will dis-
cuss the history of tribal adjudication and some of the innova-
tion in which tribal courts are currently engaged. The second
section will trace the Supreme Court’s understanding of tribal
courts and that understanding’s lack of change from its nine-
teenth-century roots. The conclusion will return to the discus-
sion of what American courts and judges can and should do to
rectify the situation.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRIBAL COURTS
As tribal nations have become increasingly sophisticated
and have extended their reach beyond the boundaries of their
reservations and communities in recent years, tribal courts
have become an increasingly important component to the suc-
cess and vitality of those nations. Although tribal nations have
always engaged in dispute resolution and the effectuation of
justice, tribal courts are playing a more practical and visible
role both inside and outside of their nations. Tribal courts are
shaping the future in ways never before thought to be possible.
To more fully understand their current role within their com-
munities, it is important to know something of the history of
tribal courts. 
It should be noted at the outset that any description of the
history of tribal courts or where they stand now is going to be
particularly broad and cannot adequately account for the com-
plete range of experiences of all tribal nations and courts. Akin
to the descriptor “European,” terms like “Native American,”
“American Indian,” or “Native” are relatively loose, describing
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many groups of peoples within a wide geographic area with
quite a bit of diversity among themselves. Nonetheless, some
generalizations are reasonably applicable to the many groups.
Before contact with Europeans, tribal nations resolved dis-
putes within the nations through their own processes, and
many tribal nations continued to engage in their own dispute
resolution for some time after contact. While many of the
numerous treaties in the long history of relations between
tribal nations and the United States contained some lan-
guage—often referred to as “bad men” clauses—as to who had
the authority to punish wrongdoers, in general tribal nations
punished their own, and the federal government was autho-
rized to punish non-Indians who committed wrongful acts on
tribal lands or toward tribal peoples. A brief example of one
tribal adjudicative process is illustrative of not only the tribal
system but of the purposes and goals of that system.
In the summer of 1881, Crow Dog, a leader among the Brule
Lakota, killed Spotted Tail, another member of the Brule
Lakota. Although it is likely impossible to ever know exactly
why Crow Dog took this action, internal tribal politics were
undoubtedly involved. Crow Dog was a leader among the
Brule, having arrived at his position among the community
through traditional means. Spotted Tail, on the other hand,
had been appointed by the federal government as a tribal
leader and enjoyed the spoils of a relationship with the federal
government.2 The two men were political rivals who looked to
disrupt each other’s authority and were potentially at odds for
personal reasons as well.3
The Brule Lakota community moved quickly to address the
crime and resolve the dispute among the families. While it was
the federal Indian agent on the reservation who called the
tribal council the day after the killing, the council proceeded
under Brule law.4 Peacemakers were sent to both families to
negotiate a settlement, to restore Spotted Tail’s family to as near
to whole as could be accomplished, and to return the greater
community to a position of balance and harmony. Crow Dog
and his family agreed to give $600, eight horses, and a blanket
to the family of Spotted Tail—an astounding sum in the 1880s,
and a show of respect and deference for the slain man.5
It is perhaps easy to misunderstand the arrangement
between the families of Spotted Tail and Crow Dog that was
facilitated by the leaders of the Brule Lakota, and that misun-
derstanding may help to explain at least some of the federal
government’s insistence in inter-
jecting itself ever more deeply into
internal tribal affairs. The negoti-
ated settlement was not a payment
of hush money or an example of a
privileged member of a society
buying his way out of justice.
Rather, it was reflective of the resti-
tutive nature of Brule Lakota soci-
ety, and many tribal societies. The
purpose of criminal justice was not
offender-and-punishment focused;
instead, the focus was on the victim’s family, the community,
and the offender’s responsibility to make restitution to the best
of his or her ability. In general, traditional tribal communities
were focused less on the crime itself and more on how to cor-
rect the ill effects of the crime. Writing about Crow Dog’s fam-
ily’s payment to the family of Spotted Tail, one commentator
noted that it was not “blood money,” but rather the payment
was “an offer of reconciliation and a symbolic commitment to
continuation of tribal social relations.”6 This is just one exam-
ple of the community-centered vision of crime, law, and resti-
tution within tribal communities, as the Brule were hardly the
only tribal nation with a deep and sophisticated appreciation
for jurisprudential reasoning.7
Yet, by the late nineteenth century, the federal government
was rethinking and reconfiguring its political relationship
with Native peoples, and began engaging in a concerted effort
to destroy tribalism in both the quest for tribal lands and in
the name of civilization. The period of time from the early
1870s to the early 1930s is often dubbed the “Allotment Era”
after the Allotment Act,8 or Dawes Act, the major piece of
congressional legislation that divested tribal nations of
approximately ninety million acres of land (roughly equiva-
lent to the state of Montana) and symbolized a new era of fed-
eral policy of forced assimilation toward Native peoples.9 The
general tenor of the times for the politicians, bureaucrats,
reformers of the era, and other “friends of the Indian” was
perhaps best summed up by one of the major figures of the
time and the man most responsible for the proliferation of
Indian boarding schools, Richard Henry Pratt. Succinctly
describing the second biggest goal of the Allotment Era
(behind acquiring additional tribal lands), Pratt claimed that
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he wanted to “[k]ill the Indian
and save the man.”10
True to the spirit of the
Allotment Era, the federal gov-
ernment sought to replace tra-
ditional tribal methods of adju-
dication with a Western model
under the guise of bringing
civilization to the supposedly
simple savages. In the late
nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, Indian agents on a
number of reservations established tribal courts based on an
American model. The earliest efforts to establish these courts
were spearheaded by Secretary of the Interior Henry M. Teller,
who saw them as a tool to disrupt the supposedly heathenish
ways of tribes and to diminish the influence of tribal leaders,
especially medicine men, who resisted the efforts of the federal
government.11 These early tribal courts, called the Court of
Indian Offenses or sometimes CFR courts (in reference to their
establishment through the Code of Federal Regulations12), were
staffed by either members of the Indian police—another
weapon wielded by Indian agents to destroy tribalism—or by
an influential member of the community who had gained
enough of the agent’s trust to be appointed with the task of
spreading civilization by punishing those who continued to
practice traditional ways or who otherwise caused disruption
within the tribal community. Put simply by one commentator,
“A major goal for these courts was the destruction of tribal
law.”13 A number of CFR courts continue to operate on reser-
vations today, although their purpose and scope have been
amended to benefit the administration of tribally generated law,
rather than to purposefully destroy it.14
In the wake of the Allotment Era, particularly at points
when Congress has been more supportive and receptive of
tribal governments, many tribal nations developed their own
Western-influenced court systems. Again, the diversity of
experiences among tribal nations makes it difficult to general-
ize about these courts. For instance, although some of these
tribal-court systems are relatively new, many are now decades
old with a growing body of caselaw to draw upon. And while
some were established through the acts of tribal legislatures
and exist as part of a tribal code, others are established as a sep-
arate branch of government guaranteed through a tribal con-
stitution. Today it is estimated that there are over three hun-
dred tribal courts currently operating in Indian Country.15
Perhaps the most sophisticated, well-rounded court system
in Indian Country belongs to the Navajo. The “modern”
Navajo court system began in 1892 with the establishment of
a CFR court on the reservation.16 Like any other Native com-
munity, the Navajo had a system for resolving disputes before
the influence of Western forces and were forced to adapt to
their circumstances when the CFR court was established.
Nonetheless, the Navajo rid themselves of the CFR court and
established a tribal court under their own authority in 1958,17
established an appellate court in 1978,18 and engaged in
reforms in 1985 that led to the current Navajo Supreme Court,
the highest court in the Navajo Nation.19
The reforms of the 1980s were responding both to a politi-
cal crisis within the Navajo Nation and to, as former Navajo
Supreme Court Associate Justice Raymond D. Austin has put
it, a “general consensus among Navajo judges that the Navajo
Nation needed an alternative to the Western form.”20 During
this period, the Navajo court system began a concerted and
deliberate effort to re-infuse the law of the nation—mostly
found in the tribal code and through the structures of tribal
government that mimicked an American model—with the pre-
cepts of Navajo common law, which were more suited to the
needs of the community.
By deciding that they were going to “empahsiz[e the] use of
Navajo normative precepts,”21 the Navajo courts did not reject,
dismantle, or discard the laws, procedures, or rules that
appeared to be “Western” or that had been established by the
duly elected tribal council. Rather, the court began reading
those rules in a manner in accordance with the foundational,
traditional law of the Navajo. A deep examination of Navajo
common law is beyond the scope of this article. (For those
who are interested, Associate Justice Austin’s book, Navajo
Courts and Navajo Common Law, offers an exceedingly clear
detailing.) However, it suffices to note that one of the primary
goals of the Navajo worldview is to achieve a place where all
things are at balance and working in harmony with one
another.22 Not unlike reading state and federal law against the
backdrop of the American constitution, Navajo courts have
steadily built a caselaw that reintroduces this foundational law
into contemporary cases and settings and reads “modern” law
in accordance with Navajo common law. Other tribal courts
have also followed this model and are reading their “modern”
law in accordance with their “traditional” law.
Another more modern rearticulation of tribal common law
has been what are generally called peacemaker courts. These
tribal courts generally operate in a different process whereby
the adversarial system is eschewed in favor of a more integra-
tive event where a community leader or mediator brings a vic-
tim, offender, and family and friends of the parties together to
discuss the offending behavior, to give all parties a chance to
speak, and to come to a consensual result in the dispute.
Meetings of peacemaker courts might be preceded with a meal
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and a prayer to emphasize both the communal and spiritual
aspects of the event that is about to take place.23 As part of its
reforms in the 1980s, the Navajo court system created peace-
maker courts,24 but they have hardly been the only tribal com-
munities to do so.25 Peacemaker courts not only more closely
align with more traditional tribal adjudicative systems (as was
employed in the Crow Dog/Spotted Tail incident), but they also
often generate a greater sense of involvement and engagement
for the offender, victim, and other interested parties that can be
missing in the more formal processes found in American courts.
The Navajo court system’s adoption of Navajo common law
and peacemaker courts are just two quick examples of the
means through which tribal courts are contributing ever more
to their nations and are becoming significant pillars of the
community. Tribal courts do still face a number of practical
challenges, including financial difficulties and a small pool of
legal talent. But they are beginning to meet those challenges in
new and necessary ways and are establishing themselves as
innovative forces for the greater good. By interjecting tribal
common law into modern settings and by creating processes
that fit the community, tribal courts are doing the practical
work of not only resolving disputes among the community but
keeping the traditions and spirit of the people alive.
AMERICAN PERCEPTIONS OF TRIBAL ADJUDICATION
Despite their increased importance, tribal courts continue to
face a number of obstacles not faced by other American
courts—some more surmountable than others. Perhaps the
biggest hurdle that tribal courts and other forms of tribal dis-
pute resolution have traditionally faced is a lack of faith in the
process, and often outright scorn, from non-Native peoples and
institutions. Tribal forms of dispute resolution, whether they be
the more contemporary tribal courts of today or older systems
employed by tribal nations in the past, have been routinely
derided as inadequate or otherwise inappropriate. Quite often,
the strongest criticism has come from Supreme Court justices,
both in the past and more contemporarily. The lack of faith that
American officials have shown tribal courts—not to mention
tribal societies, ways of thought, and world views—throughout
the years has been one of the biggest roadblocks to establishing
and maintaining the authority of tribal adjudication.
The federal government began seriously interjecting itself in
the tribal adjudicative process in the late nineteenth century
during the Allotment Era. Two cases from the 1880s that sur-
rounded another major piece of federal legislation perhaps best
exemplify the distrust the federal government and the general
American populace held for tribal adjudicative methods in the
Allotment Era, the legacy of which continues to influence non-
Native attitudes about tribal courts.
In 1883, the Supreme Court
handed down Ex Parte Crow
Dog,26 a case that, on the surface,
looked like a victory for tribal
interests, but that nonetheless
paved the way for further con-
gressional intrusions into Indian
Country. The facts of the case
have already been described in
this article, with the family of
Crow Dog offering restitution to
the family of Spotted Tail under
Brule Lakota law. The issue was
resolved peaceably within the
community.
The federal government read
the situation much differently,
and members of the Office of
Indian Affairs (the precursor to today’s Bureau of Indian Affairs)
saw the incident as an opportunity to extend their influence
over tribal life and further the mission of “civilizing” Native
peoples.27 Conceived as a test case, the Indian agent on the
Brule reservation had Crow Dog arrested even though the agent
was aware that the matter had been settled within the tribal
nation.28 In the spring of 1882, Crow Dog was tried and con-
victed in a federal court29 in a case that everyone anticipated
was headed to the Supreme Court.30
The High Court did hear the case and rendered a decision
in 1883.31 While the Court ruled in favor of tribal interests in
the case, stating that there was no federal statue or treaty pro-
vision that gave the federal government jurisdiction over
Indian-on-Indian crime in Indian Country, the opinion was as
friendly to the losing side as one could imagine. Justice Stanley
Matthews’ opinion either showed no knowledge of the Brule
system of justice that had already resolved the matter or no
regard for it in suggesting the unfairness of subjecting suppos-
edly simple savages such as Crow Dog to the legalities of a
higher civilization. Justice Matthews stated:  
“[Our system] tries them not by their peers, nor by the cus-
toms of their people, nor the law of their land, but by superi-
ors of a different race, according to the law of a social state of
which they have an imperfect conception, and which is
opposed to the traditions of their history, to the habits of their
lives, to the strongest prejudices of their savage nature; one
which measures the red man’s revenge by the maxims of the
white man’s morality.”32
Despite his seeming (and condescending) concern for the fate
of tribal peoples, Justice Matthews nonetheless characterized the
issue as one of jurisdiction, as opposed to morality, noting that
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federal jurisdiction, “in such a
case, requires the clear expres-
sion of Congress, and that we
have not been able to find.”33
Justice Matthews’ implication
was clear: were Congress to act,
then the Court was likely to
rule differently in the future.
Congress accepted Justice
Matthews’ invitation a year
later and passed the Major
Crimes Act34 in 1885. The law
extended federal jurisdiction to Indian Country over seven
“major” crimes (and remains good law today, with additional
crimes enumerated since its original passage). Armed with this
congressional blessing, federal prosecutors began trying Native
peoples for activities that originated on reservations, further
implicitly rejecting tribal methods for dispute adjudication.
One year later, in 1886, the Supreme Court was presented
with a constitutional challenge to the Major Crimes Act.
Although subsequent scholarship has revealed that the crime
did not actually take place on the reservation,35 two Native
men were nonetheless brought to trial for the murder of
another Native man under the Major Crimes Act. In an
astounding opinion that not only remains good law but is reg-
ularly cited for its central proposition, the Supreme Court
ruled against the tribal members and upheld the constitution-
ality of the law.36 Straining for constitutional authority for the
federal law, lawyers for the United States argued in their brief
before the Supreme Court that the Indian Commerce Clause37
authorized the legislation because if Native peoples were
allowed to kill one another, then there would be fewer with
whom to engage in commerce.38
Unsurprisingly, the Supreme Court rejected this argument,
noting that “it would be a very strained construction”39 of the
Indian Commerce Clause. While this should have been the end
of the analysis, Justice Samuel Freeman Miller continued: 
“But these Indians are within the geographical limits
of the United States. The soil and the people within
these limits are under the political control of the gov-
ernment of the United States, or of the states of the
Union. There exists within the broad domain of sover-
eignty but these two.”40
Reflecting on the often contentious relationship between
the states and tribal nations, and declaring that states are often
the “deadliest enemies”41 of tribal nations, Miller concluded
that the authority to enact the Major Crimes Act “must exist in
[the federal] government, because it never has existed any-
where else; because the theater of its exercise is within the geo-
graphical limits of the United States; because it has never been
denied; and because it alone can enforce its laws on all the
tribes.”42 Still regularly cited, United States v. Kagama essen-
tially stands for the proposition that congressional authority
over Native peoples is unconstrained by the Constitution.
Although somewhat implicit, the opinion makes clear that
Justice Miller, as well as many others involved at various levels
of Indian affairs, had little to no regard for tribal methods and
systems of justice. Stating that the power to punish tribal crim-
inals must exist in the federal government “because it has never
existed anywhere else,” and that the United States “alone can
enforce its law on tribes,” evidenced a true indifference to the
practices of tribal peoples, the methodologies that they
employed, and the goals they sought to accomplish for their
communities through their various dispute-resolution systems.
When tribal nations began developing their own Western-
influenced courts during the twentieth century, Congress also
began to take a greater interest. Responding to the perceived
problem of tribal governmental abuses on reservations—at a
point in American history when civil rights were a topic of
considerable national discussion—Congress passed the Indian
Civil Rights Act of 1968.43 The Indian Civil Rights Act
imposed a number of guarantees from the Bill of Rights upon
tribal governments, while also seeking to balance those impo-
sitions with respect for tribal traditions and the severe eco-
nomic difficulties that were facing tribal nations. For example,
tribal nations are required to allow lawyers into their courts if
those under its jurisdiction so request, but they are not
required to provide counsel for indigent clients44 (although
many today do so45). The Indian Civil Rights Act also limited
the criminal punishments to which a tribal nation could sen-
tence a defendant. Originally set at six months in jail and a
$500 fine, the statute was amended in 1986 to increase the
penalties to one year and a $5,000 fine. Tribal reaction to the
Indian Civil Rights Act was mixed, with some arguing that it
was fine in principle but that it was unnecessary, others argu-
ing that it was an unwarranted intrusion into tribal sover-
eignty, and most arguing that the real threat to the civil rights
of individuals on reservations was not from tribal governments
but from the federal and state governments.46
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The Indian Civil Rights Act is undoubtedly a limitation on
tribal governmental authority, at the very least akin to the way
that the federal Constitution is a limitation on the authority of
the federal government. Nonetheless, the Indian Civil Rights
Act marked a divergence of paths between Congress and the
Supreme Court. Beginning in the 1970s Congress began offer-
ing greater support to tribal courts in what has become termed
the Self-Determination Era of federal policy.
Perhaps the greatest example of Congress’s commitment to
tribal courts and sovereignty over the last forty years has been
the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978.47 The federal legislation
allowed tribal courts to assume child-custody proceedings for
children who are tribal members or who are eligible to become
tribal members. Occasionally misunderstood in the media,48
the Indian Child Welfare Act does not automatically divest
non-Indian adoptive or foster parents of their children. Rather,
it simply gives tribal courts the authority to make the determi-
nations of the best interests of the child. Congress has also
passed other legislation in the furtherance of tribal courts and
justice in Indian Country49 as well as other significant pieces
of legislation to foster tribal self-governance in the Self-
Determination Era. This includes the recently passed Tribal
Law and Order Act.50 Signed into law in 2010, the Tribal Law
and Order Act extends the potential reach of tribal courts in a
number of significant ways, including better training for tribal
law enforcement, the capacity for stronger criminal sentencing
for tribal courts in compliance with certain standards, and
requirements for federal prosecutors to explain why they
declined to prosecute crimes in Indian Country. Although it is
too early to tell if the Tribal Law and Order Act is having its
intended effect, it nonetheless holds much promise and is
reflective of the general congressional policy toward tribal
nations and their courts.
Yet, while Congress has moved since the 1970s to
strengthen tribal courts and increase their jurisdiction, the
Supreme Court has moved completely in the opposite direc-
tion. Beginning with Oliphant v. Susquamish Indian Tribe51 in
1978 and steadily continuing into the present day, the Supreme
Court has adopted the practice of defining and limiting the
scope of tribal-court jurisdiction, interjecting the judicial
branch into the federal government’s relationship with tribal
nations in an a previously unprecedented manner.
The Court in Oliphant decided that tribal nations did not
have criminal jurisdiction over non-Natives because it was
“inconsistent with their status.”52 This watershed case marked
the moment when the Supreme
Court began to make clear that it
would hold what has become an
ever-increasing role in defining
the “status” of tribal nations.
Certainly in contradistinction
to, and perhaps in response to,
Congress’s increasing support
for tribal nations and their
courts, the Supreme Court has
announced a number of cases
that have limited the scope of
tribal authority, particularly in
respect to tribal jurisdiction.53
The Supreme Court’s divergent path from Congress and its
increasing willingness to define the metes and bounds of tribal
jurisdiction according to the eminently pliable standard of the
“status” of tribal nations has, on principle, been deeply dis-
concerting to tribal nations and others concerned with tribal
sovereignty. And yet, the level of tribal trepidation has only
been compounded by the type of language that the justices
often employ to describe tribal courts, much of which is not
particularly discernible from the earlier nineteenth-century
precedents that first engaged with tribal adjudication. In some
cases, the Court has used the exact language of the cases from
the nineteenth century. For example, then-Associate Justice
William Rehnquist’s opinion in Oliphant quoted extensively
from Crow Dog—albeit carefully removing the more clearly
racist portions of the excerpt, some of which can be seen ear-
lier in this article—to essentially assert the proposition that
since it was unfair to subject Indians to the white man’s law
nearly a century previous, it was conversely unfair to subject
non-Indians to tribal law in the contemporary setting. One
scholar writing about Rehnquist’s opinion in Oliphant has
stated that it, “unembarrassedly perpetuates [the] overarching
principle of white racial supremacy”54 found in nineteenth-
century cases and that, “it does so through a particularly viru-
lent mode of rights-destroying, jurispathic transmission.”55
The same scholar also notes that Rehnquist’s opinion “cites,
quotes, and relies upon racist nineteenth century beliefs and
stereotypes to justify an expansive, rights-destroying, present-
day interpretation of [tribal rights].”56
Those without even a passing knowledge of Indian law
might be able to compartmentalize the opinion in Oliphant as
the likely last gasp of a dying attitude toward minorities during
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a period of social change. However, those with even a cursory
knowledge of Indian law (or of Rehnquist’s tremendous influ-
ence over the Court for that matter) know better. The Supreme
Court’s seeming wariness, if not outright hostility, toward tribal
courts has grown, and is little changed in terms of justifications
from those of the nineteenth-century courts. For example,
Associate Justice David Souter’s concurrence in Nevada v.
Hicks,57 a case decided in 2001 that again limited the authority
of tribal courts, was perhaps a little more telling than even he
fully understood when he noted, “Limiting tribal-court civil
jurisdiction . . . not only applies the animating principle behind
our precedents, but fits with historical assumptions about tribal
authority . . . .”58 (Emphasis added.) Souter also stated that it
was important to know the boundaries of tribal court jurisdic-
tion because tribal courts “differ from traditional American
courts in a number of significant respects.”59 Conceding that
many of the important guarantees in the Bill of Rights were
applied to tribal nations through the Indian Civil Rights Act,
Souter nonetheless noted, by quoting Oliphant, that tribal
courts were able to define for themselves how to apply concepts
such as due process and equal protection.60 Souter also showed
hesitance toward tribal common law, stating that “the resulting
law applicable in tribal courts is a complex mix of tribal codes,
and federal, state, and traditional law,” which he claimed,
“would be unusually difficult for an outsider to sort out.”61
The clear implication of the totality of Souter’s concurrence
is that tribal courts, which are “different” from American
courts, are unwilling or incapable of protecting the rights of
individuals simply because they are tribal courts. The underly-
ing presumption that tribal courts are incapable of being fair
(and more specifically that tribal conceptions of due process
and equal protection will inherently be lesser than their
American counterparts) is perhaps unlikely to withstand any
serious scrutiny and has already been called into serious ques-
tion with respect to at least one prominent tribal court.62
Maybe more importantly, it shows little discernable difference
from the assumptions made about tribal nations, peoples, and
adjudicatory systems from over a hundred years ago.
Unfortunately Justice Souter is not alone in his assumptions
about tribal courts, as seemingly every decision concerning
tribal-court jurisdiction since Oliphant evidences the type of
skepticism of tribal courts that was not uncommon in the deci-
sions of the Allotment Era over a hundred years ago.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has not always been hostile to tribal
court interests,63 but it has generally only ruled in the favor of
tribal courts when their proceedings concerned tribal mem-
bers. Whenever non-Native interests have been at stake, the
Supreme Court has shown little, if any, respect toward tribal
courts. This disregard for tribal courts has changed little, if at
all, since the nineteenth century and has trickled down to the
lower American courts.
This disregard is quite possibly the greatest obstacle that
tribal courts have historically faced and face today. Constantly
challenged by their American counterparts, tribal courts face
the uphill battle of establishing their legitimacy. While there
has been some movement, particularly on the state level,64 to
give some effect to tribal-court decisions and orders, a general
hostility remains and is spearheaded by the Supreme Court.
Despite the innovation of tribal courts and their ability to serve
not only their own communities but the greater good as well,
they have been consistently curtailed by the Supreme Court
and state courts. While Congress has given greater sanction to
tribal courts and their jurisdiction, the American judiciary has
generally moved in the opposite direction. One of the driving
forces behind this resistance is the same perspective about
tribal nations and adjudicatory methods that existed in the
1880s.
The time has come for American judges to examine their
own attitudes about tribal courts. Perhaps unreflectively, many
American judges appear to assume the worst about tribal
courts and are fearful of what they imagine tribal courts to be
without truly examining them for what they are, perpetuating
notions about tribal nations, governance, and judicial proceed-
ings that are rooted in the nineteenth century. Like any human
institution, tribal courts are capable of mistakes and abuses
(not unlike the American political system itself). But the “on
the ground” activities of tribal courts strongly suggest that they
operate with at least the same level of fairness, thought, and
balance as other American courts and that they are succeeding
in the difficult task of functioning for those whose cases are
before them under the types of stresses no other court system
faces. By examining tribal courts and their decisions for what
they are, and not for what they have been imagined to be for
well over a hundred years, state and federal court judges could
go a long way in establishing the legitimacy of their tribal
brethren and solving the continuing problems of law enforce-
ment in Indian Country.
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